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I. INTRODUCTION
The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment states: "In
[s]uits at common law, ...no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law."' Until Gaspeprini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,2
the Supreme Court had interpreted the Seventh Amendment to allow
federal trial judges to use remittitur when a jury's verdict was exces-
sive,3 but the Court had not allowed federal appellate courts to question
trial judges' refusals to exercise this power.4 Such appellate review,
after the trial judge's decision to allow the verdict to stand, would
amount to actual review of the verdict. Because the Seventh Amend-
ment does not apply to state courts, state appellate courts can review
trial judges' refusals to exercise remittitur,5 a process by which the
plaintiff is forced to select between an award that is less than the jury's
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889) (right of trial
by jury not impaired by requiring prevailing party to remit portion of jury verdict as condition of
court's refusing new trial motion).
4. See Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879):
Whether [the refusal to exercise remittur] was erroneous or not, our power is
restricted by the Constitution to the determination of the questions of law arising
upon the record. Our authority does not extend to a re-examination of facts which
have been tried by the jury under instructions correctly defining the legal rights of
parties.
Id. at 31-32.
5. See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. 532 (1874).
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verdict or a new trial.6 Therefore, the Court's post-Erie decisions raised
the issue of what to do when a federal diversity case is governed by the
laws of a state that would allow a federal appellate court to review a trial
judge's refusal to reduce an excessive jury verdict.
In previous cases raising this issue, the Court based its decisions on
other grounds.7 However, in Gasperini, five U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices determined that the Seventh Amendment Re-Examination Clause
does not apply in diversity cases.8 This Note illustrates how a majority
of the Court misapplied the Erie9 doctrine to conclude that the Seventh
Amendment protection against re-examination does not apply to federal
appellate courts in diversity cases.
The Gasperini case was brought by a well-regarded journalist, Wil-
liam Gasperini, who contracted with the Center for the Humanities (the
"Center") to supply the Center with original color transparencies of pho-
tographs that he took.1° Gasperini delivered the 300 transparencies to
the Center.1 The Center incorporated the transparencies into a video-
tape and was obligated to pay a royalty to Gasperini.' 2 The Center was
to return the transparencies once the video was completed, but could not
locate them.
13
Gasperini brought a diversity action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 4 The Center admitted its
liability. Thus, only the issue of damages was tried to a jury. 5 Gas-
pirini presented an expert witness who testified that the industry stan-
dard within the photographic publishing community valued lost
transparencies at $1,500 each. 6 The jury returned a verdict of
$450,000, an amount equal to $1,500 for each of the 300
transparencies. I 7
After trial, the Center moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of
6. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
7. See id.:
We have never held expressly that the Seventh Amendment allows appellate review
of a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an award as excessive. Although
we granted certiorari in two cases in order to consider the issue, in both instances we
found it unnecessary to reach the question when we decided the case.
Id. at 279 n.25.
8. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
9. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).










the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The Center argued that the ver-
dict exceeded the amount that a New York state court would have
awarded.19 Nonetheless, the district court denied the motion without
comment.2" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the trial court had an "obligation to patrol the outer bounds
of what damages a jury may reasonably award, and to offer a choice
between remittitur and a new trial when those bounds have been
exceeded."21 On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the Second Circuit and remanded the case to the district court so that the
trial judge could test the jury's verdict against the state standard, subject
to appellate review for abuse of discretion.22
II. HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment histori-
cally limited courts by applying the rules derived from English common
law. "[W]hen a trial by jury has been had in an action at law .... the
facts there tried and decided cannot be reexamined in any court of the
United States, otherwise than according to the rules of the common law
of England."23 In the eighteenth century, England had three common
law courts of record with original jurisdiction: the Exchequer, the
King's Bench, and the Court of Common Pleas.24
Although all three courts satat Westminster, legal actions were
rarely tried there." Instead, judges from all courts travelled to different
circuits and tried cases in individual circuits under the nisi prius sys-
tem.26 Many cases were tried in the litigant's county. The judges
returned the verdicts from the various circuits to Westminster, where the
full court entered the respective judgments.
The English common law system restricted post-trial review. At
common law, an appeal and a motion for a new trial "were mutually




21. See id. at 431.
22. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225.
23. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899).
24. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 56 (3d ed. 1990).
25. See W.R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 1750-1950, at 23
(1989); G.R.Y. RADCLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 90, 183-84 (3d ed.
1954).
26. See CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 25, at 23; RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 91,
186.
27. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 91, 186.
28. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 482 n.9 (1933).
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was heard by a different and higher court.29 Review under the "writ of
error" was limited to errors of law appearing in the record of process,
pleadings, verdict, and judgment.30 Errors of law included "discrepan-
cies between the amounts claimed and those awarded, irregularities in
the panel of jurors, failure to notify parties of adjournments, and so
on."31
A motion for new trial, on the other hand, "was addressed to the
discretion of the court [en] banc" at Westminster.12  The plaintiff or
defendant moved for a new trial before judgment was entered by the full
court, and the motion was not an appellate procedure. The motion was
filed after the jury reached its verdict, and judgment was not entered
until the motion was denied.3 3 The en banc court based its decision on
information provided by the trial judge. The decision was final and not
subject to further review as to factual matters.34 In other words, the
motion was passed upon by the same court in which the action was
brought and tried, not by a different court of appeal.
35
Moreover, "no English court ever set aside . . . a verdict, except
with the concurrence of the judge, or judges, who sat with the jury, saw
the witnesses and heard them testify.1 36 Thus, the verdict stood unless
the judge who "presided at the trial and heard the witnesses deemed the
verdict to be unjustified and, even then, only if he could persuade his
29. The system of review was complicated by the fact that the same court might sit at
different times in a trial or review capacity. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 158; A.T. CARTER, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 88 (1902); RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 212-
13.
30. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 157; WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1158, 1161
(Thomas M. Cooley 4th ed. 1899); RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 211; Note,
Appealability of Rulings on Motion for New Trial in the Federal Courts, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 575,
575 (1950).
31. A.K.R. KIRALFY, POITER'S OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 68 (5th ed. 1958).
32. Fairmount Glass Works, 287 U.S. at 482 n.9.
33. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 186-87.
34. "[O]ne could not appeal against a refusal of the court en banc to grant a new trial." Id. at
211-12. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 447-48, 883-88, 897-98. In 1854, the Common
Law Procedure Act allowed the Exchequer Chamber to review a refusal to grant a new trial in a
limited class of cases, but it maintained an important restriction: "where the application for a new
trial is upon Matter of Discretion only, as on the ground that the Verdict was against the Weight of
Evidence or otherwise, no such Appeal shall be allowed." Fairmount Glass Works, 287 U.S. at
482-83 n.9.
35. The power to grant a new trial was "exercised before judgment, and not by a court of
appeal. Once the court en banc had given judgment, the only redress was of the limited kind
provided by writ of error." BAKER, supra note 24, at 159. See also Metropolitan R.R. Co. v.
Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 573 (1887) (noting similar practice in trial courts of District of Columbia);
KIRALFY, supra note 31, at 56 (nisi prius judge recorded the verdict, but judgment was entered at
Westminster).




brethren at Westminster to this view.'"" The en banc court generally
followed the trial judge's recommendation. 38  "The [en banc] court
would not.., order a new trial simply because it did not agree with the
verdict. If there was no misdirection [of the jury] and there was some
evidence on which the verdict could be supported, [the verdict] must
stand."
39
Following the mandate of the Re-Examination Clause of the Sev-
enth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court relied on the English
common law principles at least twenty times to bar federal appellate
court review of verdicts, which did not exist in the common law.4'
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs
the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of
witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate con-
clusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it con-
siders most reasonable. 4 '
Until Gasperini, the Court had uniformly held that the Seventh Amend-
ment prohibited federal appellate courts from reviewing any finding of
fact made by a jury and approved by the trial court. In Parsons v. Bed-
ford, a nineteenth century diversity case, Justice Story found that the
district court did not err by refusing the defendant's request to transcribe
testimony, because the request was made "in order to establish the error
of the verdict in matters of fact."42 Justice Story further explained that
the Seventh Amendment's prohibition on appellate review of factual
questions rendered the application for a transcript immaterial.43
37. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2819 (2d ed.
1995).
38. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 101.
39. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 25, at 187. See also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 424 (1994) (recognizing "the deference ordinarily afforded jury verdicts" at common
law and in early American courts).
40. See, e.g., infra notes 42-49. None of these cases presented the precise issue decided in
Gasperini: whether a federal appellate court can review a federal trial court's refusal to exercise
remittitur in a diversity case where a state appellate court would be able to do so.
41. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
42. 28 U.S. 433, 445 (1830).
43. See id. at 447-48. See also Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 402 (1896) ("[A]sk[ing the
Court] to determine the weight of proof [would] usurp the province of the jury"); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 91 (1891) ("We have no concern with questions of fact, or the weight to
be given to the evidence which was properly admitted."); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29
(1889) ("this court has no authority to pass upon any question of fact involved in the consideration
of the motion for a new trial."); Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 85 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1873) ("Facts
found by a jury could only be re-examined under the rules of the common law .... Nothing,
therefore, is open to re-examination in this case .. "); Barreda v. Silsbee, 62 U.S. 146, 166
(1858) ("Whether the jury were warranted in so finding or not, is not a question for an appellate
tribunal. That question cannot be re-examined by this court."); United States v. Laub, 37 U.S. 1, 5
(1838) ("[I]t is a point too well settled, to be now drawn in question, that the effect and sufficiency
1998]
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In Railroad Company v. Fraloff, another nineteenth century case,
the Court addressed the question of whether an allegedly excessive ver-
dict could be reviewed on appeal when the defendant did not raise an
issue of faulty jury instructions or other trial error.' Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, held that appellate review was unavailable:
[T]his court cannot reverse the judgment because, upon examination
of the evidence, we may be of the opinion that the jury should have
returned a verdict for a less amount .... Whether [the trial court's
refusal to disturb the verdict], in that particular, was erroneous or not,
our power is restricted by the Constitution to the determination of the
questions of law arising upon the record. Our authority does not
extend to a re-examination of facts which have been tried by the jury
under instructions correctly defining the legal rights of parties.45
Subsequently, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the rule that "a
case of mere excess upon the evidence is a matter to be dealt with by the
trial court [and] does not present a question for re[-]examination" in
appellate courts.4 6 This century, Justice Brandeis stated that:
The rule that this Court will not review the action of a federal trial
court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial for error of fact
of the evidence, are for the consideration and determination of the jury; and the error is to be
redressed, if at all, by application to the court below for a new trial ...."); Marine Ins. Co. of
Alexandria v. Young, 9 U.S. 187, 191 (1809) (It is improper for an appellate court to re-examine a
denial of a motion for a new trial "upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to evidence.").
44. 100 U.S. 24 (1879).
45. Id. at 31-32.
46. Southern Ry. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87 (1914) (jurisdiction based on federal question
tried in and appealed from a state court). See also St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft,
237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915) (excessiveness of verdict "involves only a question of fact and is not
open to reconsideration here."); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 237 U.S. 208, 215 (1915) (Whether
"the trial court [erred] in not directing a remittitur because of the assumed excessive amount of the
verdict is not open" to review.); Herencia v. Guzman, 219 U.S. 44, 45 (1910) ("As there was
evidence proper for the consideration of the jury the objection that the verdict was against the
weight of evidence or that the damages allowed were excessive cannot be considered."); Lincoln
v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 437 (1894) (the Court cannot re-examine excessiveness of verdict where
"damages have been fixed by the verdict of a jury ... [and] where the complaint is only of the
action of the jury."); New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U.S. 60, 75 (1892)
(Excessiveness of jury verdict is not reviewable on appeal, and "correction of [the jury's] error, if
there were any, lay with the court below upon a motion for a new trial, the granting or refusal of
which is not assignable for error here"); Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 456 (1883)
(Court is "without authority to disturb the judgment upon the ground that the damages are
excessive ... [w]hether the order overruling the motion for a new trial based upon that ground
was erroneous or not."). Consider also Wilson v. Everett:
[The excessiveness of the verdict] was a question to be reached only through a
motion for a new trial; and we cannot, on this writ of error, review any error
committed in that respect by the jury, if there were one. Nor can we take
cognizance of the complaint that the court overruled the motion for a new trial ....
The case was fairly submitted to the jury, and the issues involved were passed upon
by them.
139 U.S. 616, 621 (1891).
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has been settled by a long and unbroken line of decisions; and has
been frequently applied where the ground of the motion was that the
damages awarded by the jury were excessive or were inadequate.
The rule precludes likewise a review of such action by a circuit court
of appeals.4 7
A few years after Justice Brandeis' statement, the Court reaffirmed that
"denial of a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence would not be subject to review."48 As
late as 1954, the Court, in a diversity case, again declared that
"[a]ppellate review in the federal courts is, of course, limited ultimately
by the Seventh Amendment."4 9
Until recently, the lower federal courts followed the same rule that
the power to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence
"belongs exclusively to the trial judge," whose action on a motion of
this kind "is not the subject of review," and that the appellate court is
"without power" to order a new trial on this ground.50
Judge Learned Hand stated, "A motion for a new trial, though very
ancient, was never regarded as part of the bill [of exceptions], but rather
as an independent method of review, and there was no review of that
review.""1 In 1953, Judge Hand again stated that the rule "is too well
established to justify discussion" that "there may be errors that are not
reviewable at all, and among those that are not are erroneous orders
granting or denying motions to set aside verdicts on the ground that they
are against the weight of the evidence. 52
Some of the federal courts of appeals changed their approach, how-
ever, after the revision and recodification of the Judicial Code in 1948.
This revision removed the explicit statutory ban on reversals "for any
error in fact" that had existed since 1789. Some federal appellate courts
believed that this revision and recodification was intended to work a
radical alteration in federal appellate practice. These courts gradually
began to assert the authority to grant a new trial, or a remittitur, on
grounds of excessiveness of a trial verdict.5 3 The Supreme Court
47. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481 (1933) (footnotes
omitted) (jurisdiction based on diversity).
48. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 248 (1940) (jurisdiction based on
federal question).
49. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 n.5 (1954).
50. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 37, § 2819, at 199 (footnotes omitted).
51. Miller v. Maryland Cas. Co., 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930) (citation omitted)
(jurisdiction based on diversity).
52. Portman v. American Home Prods. Corp., 201 F.2d 847, 848 (2d Cir. 1953) (jurisdiction
based on diversity).
53. See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 800 (2d Cir. 1961) (asserting
their power to review in a federal question case, but affirming).
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implicitly approved of that trend in 1950 with the dictum in a federal
question case: "We agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
damages awarded by the District Court's judgment is not monstrous in
the circumstances of this case."54
Since then, the appellate courts have interpreted the Court's dictum
as implicitly authorizing appellate review of the weight of the evidence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. This expansion of appellate
power drew criticism. 55 The Eighth56 and Second 57 Circuits continued
to question whether such authority existed in federal question or diver-
sity cases.
The Supreme Court subsequently encountered three opportunities
to address this issue directly, but the Court instead decided each case on
other grounds. In the first of these cases, the Court reviewed a Fourth
Circuit decision granting a new trial on the grounds that the jury
awarded excessive damages. 8 Instead of addressing the constitutional
authority for the appellate court's action, the Court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the jury verdict because
the verdict had sufficient "support in the record. '59 In the second of
these cases, the plaintiff sought certiorari, claiming that the court of
appeals could not constitutionally reverse the district judge's refusal to
set aside a verdict for excessiveness.60 However, the Court refused to
address the constitutional question, and instead held that the trial court
properly sustained the original jury verdict.6 '
In the last of these three cases, the Court observed that:
We have never held expressly that the Seventh Amendment allows
appellate review of a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an
54. Affolder v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950).
55. Judge Blackmun expressed some reservations about the constitutionality of allowing
appellate courts to review the denial of new trial motions based on excessiveness of the verdict.
See Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 446-48 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1961) (jurisdiction
based on diversity).
56. See Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1994) (federal question);
Czajka v. Black, 901 F.2d 1484, 1485 (8th Cir. 1990) (federal question); Green v. American
Airlines, 804 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1986) (diversity).
57. See, e.g., Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1992) (federal
question); Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 1986) (diversity);
Compton v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 425 F.2d 1130, 1132 (2d Cir. 1970) (federal question).
Denial of a new trial motion "is one of those few rulings that is simply unavailable for appellate
review." Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1199 (2d Cir. 1995)
(diversity).
58. Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955) (per curiam) (jurisdiction based on federal
question).
59. Id. at 77.
60. See Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156 (1968) (jurisdiction based on
federal question).
61. See id. at 157-58.
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award as excessive. Although we granted certiorari in two cases in
order to consider the issue, in both instances we found it unnecessary
to reach the question when we decided the case.6 2
The Court then stressed that "federal courts operate under the strictures
of the Seventh Amendment. As a result, we are reluctant to stray too far
from traditional common-law standards, or to take steps which ulti-
mately might interfere with the proper role of the jury. '"63
III. ANALYSIS OF GASPERINI V. CENTER FOR HUMANITIES, INC.
In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, began by
stating that New York law allows appellate courts to review jury ver-
dicts for excessiveness and "to order new trials when the jury's award
'deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.'
64
She further explained that in order to "determine whether an award
'deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,'
New York state courts look to awards approved in similar cases. '"65
After establishing state law, Justice Ginsburg addressed the issue of
how, if at all, New York's rule for reviewing a judge's denial of a
request for remittitur should be applied in diversity cases based on New
York law, given that "[p]arallel application of § 5501(c) at the federal
appellate level would be out of sync with the federal system's division
of trial and appellate court functions, an allocation weighted by the Sev-
enth Amendment.
66
The Court proceeded to summarize the Erie doctrine, 67 "and deci-
62. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 n.25 (1989)
(jurisdiction based on diversity and federal question, but appealed on a divesity issue).
63. Id. at 280 n.26.
64. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
The appellate division shall review questions of law and questions of fact on an
appeal from a judgment or order of a court of original instance and on an appeal
from an order of the supreme court, a county court or an appellate term determining
an appeal. In reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an itemized verdict
is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven of this chapter in which it is contended
that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been
granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division
shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially
from what would be reasonable compensation.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added). With this rule, the legislature
"installed a standard 'invit[ing] more careful appellate scrutiny."' Gasperini, 116 S. Ct at 2218
(alteration in original) (quoting Ch. 266, 1986 N.Y. Laws 470 (McKinney)). Previously, review
in New York appellate courts was limited to a "shock the conscience" test which gave greater
deference to the trial court. See id. at 2218.
65. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2218.
66. Id. at 2219.
67. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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sions in Erie's path."68 The Court concluded that "[t]he dispositive
question [in the Erie analysis] is whether federal courts can give effect
to the substantive thrust of [N.Y. C.P.L.R.] § 5501(c) without untoward
alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil
cases. '"69 "Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law."70 The Court
found that for Erie purposes, "[N.Y.] CPLR § 5501(c) ... is both 'sub-
stantive' and 'procedural."' 71
In order to answer this question, the Gasperini Court first applied
the "outcome-determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Company v. York. 72
Under Guaranty's "outcome-determinative" test, the question is whether
"it significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a federal court to
disregard a law of a state that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a State court?" 73
The Guaranty Court stated that "where a federal court is exercising
jurisdiction solely because of [diversity], the outcome of the litigation in
the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court. ' 74  To prevent the "outcome-determinative" test from "be[ing]
applied mechanically to sweep in all manner of variations,"75 the Gas-
perini Court read Hanna v. Plumer76 as imposing the additional require-
ment that "application [of the 'outcome-determinative' test] must be
guided by 'the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.' 7 7
Pursuant to these three decisions, Justice Ginsburg attempted to
determine "whether New York's 'deviates materially' standard . . . is
outcome-affective. 78 In doing so, Justice Ginsburg started with the




72. 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (requiring a federal court to impose a state's statute of limitations to
an equity proceeding in diversity).
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id.
75. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220.
76. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
77. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
78. Id. (emphasis added). The test as set forth in Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. 99, is whether it is
outcome-deterninative, not the lesser standard of outcome-affective. The Court seems to base the
"outcome-affective" terminology on Hanna v. Plumer, which stated the issue as "Whether
application of the [state law] would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of
the litigants that failure to enforce it would [unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum
State, or] be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court." 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).
However, as the Gasperini Court points out, the purpose of Hanna was to add additional standards
to ensure that the "outcome-determinative" test would "not be applied mechanically to sweep in
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assumption "that a statutory cap on damages would supply substantive
law for Erie purposes."79 The Court then concluded that although
"[N.Y.] CPLR § 5501(c) differs from a statutory cap principally 'in that
the maximum amount recoverable is not set by statute, but rather is
determined by case law.' . . [T]he State's objective is manifestly
substantive."" o
If the law is considered substantive, Erie analysis focuses on
whether application of the state law meets the "twin aims" set out in
Hanna."l The Gasperini Court found "that if federal courts ignore the
change in the New York standard and persist in applying the 'shock the
conscience' test to damage awards on claims governed by New York
law, 'substantial' variations between state and federal [money judg-
ments] may be expected."82 The Court then concluded that the possibil-
ity of variations in awards was enough to satisfy the Erie "outcome-
determinative" test as well as the "twin-aims." However, the Court only
addressed one of the aims.8 3
After the Court resolved the Erie issue, it continued its analysis by
examining whether the application of the state's law would violate the
Seventh Amendment.84 The Court began its Seventh Amendment analy-
sis by discussing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., a
diversity case in which federal procedural rules required an issue to be
resolved by a jury and state law required it to be resolved by a judge.
85
In Byrd, the Court held that the first clause of the Seventh Amendment
prevented federal courts from applying state law in that situation.86
In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg distinguished Byrd by pointing out
all manner of variations," not to lower the standard to that which the Court seems to be
establishing as its measuring stick in Gasperini. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae, at 11). The
Court makes this classification with little explanation or support for its conclusion.
There is an absolutely fundamental distinction between a rule of law such as [a
statutory cap on damages], which would ordinarily be imposed upon the jury in the
trial court's instructions, and a rule of review, which simply determines how closely
the jury verdict will be scrutinized for compliance with the instructions.
Id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. "[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule [are to discourage] forum-shopping and [avoid]
inequitable administration of the laws." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
82. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2221 (alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68).
83. See id. at 2221. The Court fails to discuss whether the possibility of variations in awards
would lead to forum-shopping. "The Court commits the classic Erie mistake of regarding
whatever changes the outcome as substantive. That is not the only factor to be considered." Id. at
2238 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
84. See id. at 2221.
85. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
86. See id. at 537-39. The first clause in the Seventh Amendment reads: "In Suits at common
law .... the fight of trial by jury shall be preserved .... U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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that "Byrd involved the first clause of the Amendment, [while] ... [t]his
case involves the second."87 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg wrote that
the Court has not insisted that juries be all male, or consist of twelve
jurors, as was the case at common law.88 She also stated that "appellate
review of a federal trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a jury's
verdict as excessive is a relatively late, and less secure, development...
once deemed inconsonant with the Seventh Amendment's re-examina-
tion clause. '89 The Court then briefly reviewed its earlier cases and
hinted that it would be willing to allow appellate review, as well as
appellate decisions allowing appellate review. 90
Ultimately, the Court held that "appellate review for abuse of dis-
cretion is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment as a control neces-
sary and proper to the fair administration of justice." 91 The Court based
this holding not only on the Court's own statements, but also on the
"relatively late" practice of the appellate courts, seemingly allowing the
tail to wag the dog.92 However, the Court's holding is limited by its
instruction to appellate courts: "give the benefit of every doubt to the
judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and
whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to
which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law." 93
87. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222.
88. See id. at 2224 n.20. "This is a desperate analogy, since there is of course no comparison
between the specificity of the command of the Reexamination Clause and the specificity of the
command that there be a 'jury.' The footnote abandonment of our traditional view of the
Reexamination Clause is a major step indeed." Id. at 2236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2223.
90. See id. The Court does not state a reason for departing from its historical finding that:
No error of law appearing upon the record, this court cannot reverse the judgment
because, upon examination of the evidence, we may be of the opinion that the jury
should have returned a verdict for a less amount. If the jury acted upon a gross
mistake of facts, or were governed by some improper influence or bias, the remedy
therefore rested with the court below, under its general power to set aside the
verdict .... Whether [the trial court's refusal to exercise that power] was erroneous
or not, our power is restricted by the Constitution to the determination of the
questions of law arising upon the record. Our authority does not extend to a re-
examination of facts which have been tried by the jury under instructions correctly
defining the legal rights of parties.
Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1879).
91. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223. The Court rationalizes that "New York's dominant interest
can be respected, without disrupting the federal system, once it is recognized that the federal
district court is capable of performing the checking function." Id. at 2224. However, the Court
ignores that it requires more than the district court's application of the state law by permitting
appellate review of its decision, which is inconsistent with the federal system.
92. See id. at 2223. Not all of the circuits embraced appellate review of a trial court's refusal
to set aside a jury verdict as excessive. For example, the Eighth Circuit questioned whether the
Seventh Amendment permits appellate review of such determinations. Thongvanh v. Thalacker,
17 F.3d 256, 259-60 (1994).
93. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797,
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Justice Ginsburg also relied heavily on Browning-Ferris Industries
v. Kelco Disposal as precedent, and quoted the following passage:
"[T]he role of the district court is to determine whether the jury's verdict
is within the confines set by state law .... The court of appeals should
then review the district court's determination under an abuse-of-discre-
tion standard."94 However, Justice Ginsburg's reliance seems misplaced
given that in the Browning-Ferris opinion, the Court acknowledged that
it "never held expressly that the Seventh Amendment allows appellate
review of a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an award as
excessive. ' 95 Justice Ginsburg's Gasperini opinion took this one step
further and concluded that, "[N]othing in the Seventh Amendment pre-
cludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a motion to set
aside a jury verdict as excessive."96
Finally, the Court held that "[d]istrict court applications of the
'deviates materially' standard would be subject to appellate review
under the abuse of discretion standard." 97 Thus, the Court ordered that
the case be remanded back to the district court to measure the verdict
against the New York standard subject to appellate review for abuse of
discretion.98
806 (2d Cir. 1961)). By adopting the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Gasperini Court is
allowing review, but not with the same standard that state appellate courts would use. This result
seems to be in conflict with the "twin-aims" required by the Erie doctrine, because the use of a
different standard of review still leaves a disparity between results that a federal court would reach
and those that a state court would reach.
94. Id. at 2223 (first alteration in original) (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279). The
Court's interpretation contradicts the principle that "[t]he proper role of the trial and appellate
courts in the federal system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is ... a matter of federal law."
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (per curiam).
95. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 n.25. The Browning-Ferris Court did not have to
decide that issue because it held that even if it applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, the district
court's order would be upheld. See id. at 280. "Nor can any weight be assigned to our decision in
Browning-Ferris." Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224 (quoting Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 164
(1968)). While this is dicta, it appears to suggest that the majority of the Court is stating a
willingness to find any review, whether in diversity cases or not, to be consistent with the Seventh
Amendment. If this is true, then the Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause seems to have
been deflated, applying only to resjudicata notions that would preclude another jury from retrying
a case in which a jury verdict has become a final judgment.
97. Id. at 2225.
98. See id. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, states that he would affirm the appellate court's
decision and not give the district court judge a second chance to apply the New York standard.
See id. Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas join, believes that
neither the district court nor the federal appellate courts have the power to re-examine the jury's
verdict under the New York law. See id. at 2230-40.
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IV. COMMENT
The notion that a requirement of parity between state and federal
proceedings must be established in order to avoid forum-shopping drove
the Gasperini Court towards its holding. However, this rule should not
be so broadly applied. In fact, the Court previously stated that Congress
has the "power to regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable
of classification as either."99
Under this power, Congress enacted Rule 59 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides that following a jury trial, "[a] new
trial may be granted ... for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United
States."' 10 This language appears to echo the Seventh Amendment by
requiring that courts base their actions on common law. Yet, the Court
seems to follow those cases that ignore common law precedent and turn
these inapposite cases into the common law.
Furthermore, the Court appears to establish only partial parity. Fol-
lowing Gasperini, federal appellate courts clearly have the authority to
exercise abuse-of-discretion review, while state appellate courts can
review under the lesser deviates materially standard. Thus, in close
cases, a judge's decision would be reversed under the state standard,
while it would be affirmed under the federal standard.
The Gasperini Court could have reached a similar conclusion with-
out disregarding hundreds of years of precedent, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the Constitution. Namely, the Court could have,
and in this author's view should have, held that the district court shall
apply the state standard-as it held-subject to review as a matter of
law if it failed to apply the law. Oddly enough, the Court seems to have
intended this result, because it remanded the case back to the trial court
to give it the opportunity to apply the state standard, instead of affirming
the Second Circuit's reversal. By contrast, Justice Stevens would have
simply affirmed the Second Circuit.
Since Gasperini, the circuit courts have been asked to review dis-
trict judges' refusals to remit excessive verdicts. Yet, in all but one case,
the courts have either held that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion or remanded the case so that the district court could apply the state
standard. 10 Therefore, the standard most circuits may, in fact, be apply-
99. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
101. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576-78 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the trial court abused its discretion); Imbrogno v. Chamberlin, 89 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1996) ("On
remand, the district court should follow Connecticut law and determine if the jury verdict.., was
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ing looks only at whether the district court applied the right law, not
whether the court's decision is such that no reasonable judge could have
reached it. So long as only one district court decision has been over-
turned under Gasperini, the actual standard remains unclear. Until more
district court decisions are overturned, many hours will be spent litigat-
ing whether federal trial judges abused their discretion, and federal jury
verdicts will lack the protection that our forefathers intended when
adopting the Seventh Amendment.
Additionally, in a case where the Gasperini abuse of discretion
standard would not allow the circuit court to overturn a district court's
refusal to grant remittitur, the Tenth Circuit found that the "award was
so excessive [that] it violated the substantive element of the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution."" 2 The Tenth Circuit then explains
that it "do[es] not believe Gasperini prevents [the court] from determin-
ing in the first instance the amount of remittitur, because the issue of
how much of the ... award the United States Constitution allows is one
of constitutional fact that the appellate courts have the power to
decide."' 3 At first glance, this case seems to be moving in a direction
opposite to Gasperini, but if one looks at the policy behind Gasperini to
prevent forum-shopping, this case is actually consistent, as the substan-
tive due process requirements are identical in both federal and state
courts. Furthermore, the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to
review both federal and state court decisions for substantive due process
violations. Thus, this ruling is actually consistant with the anti-forum-
shopping policy behind Gasperini, yet it may prove to lower the stan-
dard of review.
Finally, the bold step the Court takes in Gasperini leaves several
other issues to be resolved. Does the Gasperini holding give federal
appellate courts the power to review a judge's denial of remittitur in a
diversity case where state law would not allow any appellate review?
The Court seems to be moving that way and did not limit its holding to
apply only to diversity cases. Does the Gasperini holding call into ques-
tion the Court's holding regarding the first clause of the Seventh
Amendment where the Court refused to keep issues from the jury that
would be tried by a judge in a state court? If so, the Court would be
excessive as a matter of state law."); Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 5 (2d
Cir. 1996) (remanding for reconsideration under state's "deviates materially" standard); Steinke v.
Beach Bungee, Inc., 105 F.3d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (same). For examples of cases finding
that the district judges did not abuse their discretion, see Pescatore v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 19 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding "that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Pan Am's motion for a new trial").
102. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 642 (10th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 643.
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reversing itself in a very short period of time. If not, why is one clause
of the Seventh Amendment given less protection against state actions
than another? Certainly, the Court will be asked to face these issues in
the future, but until they do, they leave the law in a turbulent state.
RICHARD L. STEINBERG
